Quickback Docs

Scoped Database

The security-filtered db handle inside an action — unsafe mode, raw SQL policy, and sharing code between actions.

Scoped Database

All actions receive a scoped db instance that automatically enforces security:

OperationOrg ScopingOwner ScopingSoft Delete FilterAuto-inject on INSERT
SELECTWHERE organizationId = ?WHERE ownerId = ?WHERE deletedAt IS NULLn/a
INSERTn/an/an/aorganizationId, ownerId from ctx
UPDATEWHERE organizationId = ?WHERE ownerId = ?WHERE deletedAt IS NULLn/a
DELETEWHERE organizationId = ?WHERE ownerId = ?WHERE deletedAt IS NULLn/a

Scoping is duck-typed at runtime — tables with an organizationId column get org scoping, tables with ownerId get owner scoping, tables with deletedAt get soft delete filtering.

async execute({ db, ctx, input }) {
  // This query automatically includes WHERE organizationId = ? AND deletedAt IS NULL
  const items = await db.select().from(applications).where(eq(applications.stage, 'interview'));

  // Inserts automatically include organizationId
  await db.insert(applications).values({ candidateId: input.candidateId, jobId: input.jobId, stage: 'applied' });

  return items;
}

Not enforced in scoped DB (by design):

  • Guards — actions ARE the authorized way to modify guarded fields
  • Masking — actions are backend code that may need raw data
  • Access — already checked before action execution

Delegated principals and databaseAccess

On a contract-v2 Cloudflare + Neon Hyperdrive project, an action can admit a configured delegated principal with access.principals:

// features/attendance/actions/confirm.ts
import { z } from "zod";
import { defineAction } from "../.quickback/define-action";

export default defineAction({
  description: "Confirm attendance from an event session",
  path: "/attendance/confirm",
  input: z.object({ response: z.enum(["yes", "no"]) }),
  access: { principals: ["event_delegate"] },
  async execute({ ctx, db, input }) {
    // ctx.principal is guaranteed and narrowed by the generated helper.
    const { eventId, personId } = ctx.principal.claims;
    return confirmAttendance(db, { eventId, personId, response: input.response });
  },
});

This is a separate authority lane, not an account impersonation. A delegated action context has no userId, active organization/team, or membership roles. If access has a PUBLIC sibling arm, the generated type includes the anonymous lane and code must narrow ctx.principal before reading it.

For an organization- or team-scoped host feature, the standalone route does not run the Better Auth activeOrgId / activeTeamId precondition before a principal access tree. Authentication and evaluateAccessPreRecord still run; the declared principals arm is the authority decision. This avoids turning an account-session field into an accidental prerequisite for delegated callers.

The generated standalone route reuses that action-specific execute context after its runtime access gates. Account, event_pass, and event_delegate actions therefore keep distinct compile-time authority types all the way into the handler. The route also reuses the action's schema-aware scoped db type, including when an unsafe/service-role client is wrapped before the call. If a relationship uses loads / exposeAs, the loaded row type is intersected with the same authority context: a single or shared hydration target is required, while targets selected by distinct relationship lanes are optional and must be narrowed by the handler.

For tables queried by authored actions, resource.databaseAccess adds an independent Postgres RLS policy without adding HTTP surface. It never mounts a read/CRUD route and never adds an OpenAPI operation. The action remains the API layer where validation, state transitions, side effects, and business logic belong; databaseAccess is only the database's row-level upper bound.

// features/attendance/attendanceEvidence.ts
import { q, defineTable } from '@quickback/compiler';

export const attendanceEvidence = q.table('attendanceEvidence', {
  id:             q.id(),
  eventId:        q.text().required(),
  personId:       q.text().required(),
  organizationId: q.scope('organization'),
  ...q.audit(),
  ...q.softDelete(),
});

export default defineTable(attendanceEvidence, {
  // Ordinary account CRUD remains organization-scoped.
  firewall: [
    { field: "organizationId", equals: "ctx.activeOrgId" },
  ],

  // Authored actions can use their caller-scoped db under one of two exact
  // row lanes. Sibling arms OR; fields in each arm AND.
  databaseAccess: {
    select: {
      or: [
        {
          roles: ["AUTHENTICATED"],
          record: {
            organizationId: { equals: "$ctx.activeOrgId" },
          },
        },
        {
          principals: ["event_delegate"],
          record: {
            eventId: { equals: "$ctx.principal.claims.eventId" },
            personId: { equals: "$ctx.principal.claims.personId" },
          },
        },
      ],
    },
  },
});

databaseAccess supports select, insert, update, and delete with a purpose-built, SQL-pushable rule language: principals, roles, recursive or/and, and record equals against a DB-visible account or principal context value. Application-only values such as userRole, functions, and request/body fields stay at the action access layer; the compiler refuses them inside database RLS rather than pretending PostgreSQL can evaluate them.

Every authorization path must contain at least one nonempty record equality. A principal-only or role-only leaf is rejected; every or arm must be bounded. An and group is bounded when at least one child bounds every expansion (for example, a principal child AND an event-id record child). A node cannot mix leaf fields with or/and, because the boolean node is the complete rule. This mandatory shape prevents an action declaration from accidentally granting the delegated principal an entire table.

The supported equality sources are ctx.userId, ctx.activeOrgId, ctx.activeTeamId, ctx.principal.actor.id, optional principal session/family ids, and ctx.principal.claims.<name> (with or without a leading $). The record keys are Drizzle/JavaScript table field names; Quickback resolves them through the table metadata and quotes the exact physical PostgreSQL identifier, so a field such as eventId: text("event-id") is safe. Unknown fields fail the compile. ADMIN and the app-only INTERNAL marker are forbidden on this DB surface, while SYSADMIN retains its explicit cms.sysadmin prerequisite. The feature is rejected outside Cloudflare + Neon Hyperdrive because those targets cannot guarantee request-scoped Postgres claims.

Scoped relational-query safety

Drizzle's relational query API — db.query.<table>.findFirst() / findMany() (including nested with: relations) — builds its SQL from the relations config and your where alone, so the scoped wrapper cannot inject the org/owner/team firewall into it. The scoped db therefore exposes the Drizzle select builder—the path where Quickback can guarantee firewall injection—and refuses db.query.<table> rather than returning unscoped rows:

async execute({ db, input }) {
  // ❌ Throws: relational queries aren't org-scoped
  const item = await db.query.media.findFirst({ where: eq(media.id, input.id) });

  // ✅ Scoped builder — firewall conditions injected automatically
  const [item] = await db.select().from(media).where(eq(media.id, input.id));
}

For nested reads, compose joins with the scoped select builder. If a Postgres-specific relational query is genuinely required, make the boundary explicit with unsafe: true and query unsafeDb.query with the full scope predicate in the WHERE (for example, eq(media.organizationId, ctx.activeOrgId)).

Unsafe Mode

Actions that need to bypass scoped DB filters (for example, platform-level support operations) can enable unsafe mode.

Use object form for explicit policy and mandatory audit metadata:

// features/admin/actions/crossTenantReport.ts
import { z } from "zod";
import { defineAction } from "../.quickback/define-action";
import { applications } from "../../applications/applications";

export default defineAction({
  description: "Generate cross-org hiring report",
  path: "/admin/cross-tenant-report",
  input: z.object({ startDate: z.string() }),
  access: { roles: ["owner"] },
  unsafe: {
    reason: "Support investigation for enterprise customer",
    adminOnly: true,      // default true
    crossTenant: true,    // default true
    targetScope: "all",   // "all" | "organization"
  },
  async execute({ unsafeDb, input }) {
    // unsafeDb bypasses scoped filters
    const allOrgs = await unsafeDb.select().from(applications);
    return allOrgs;
  },
});

Unsafe cross-tenant actions are generated with:

  • Better Auth authentication required (no unauthenticated path)
  • sysadmin gate (ctx.userRole === "sysadmin")
  • mandatory audit logging on deny/success/error

Provider note (Neon): unsafe.enabled controls app-layer scoped-query bypass, while unsafe.crossTenant controls database-layer RLS bypass. An unsafe action with crossTenant: false receives a raw Drizzle handle backed by the request database, so the caller's organization or delegated-principal claims remain active—including inside db.transaction(). Its code must still provide every intended scope predicate explicitly.

Only an action with crossTenant: true acquires the dedicated service-role handle (createServiceDb). That handle sets the quickback.service_role transaction marker instead of caller claims, and generated RLS grants it an explicit per-table bypass policy. The sysadmin guard and mandatory audit log therefore protect the same boundary that receives the RLS bypass. The audit-logging contract is otherwise identical to D1. On Cloudflare, both HTTP and Hyperdrive are supported. Hyperdrive is the recommended lane when an unsafe action also needs an interactive transaction. The deprecated Node/Bun WebSocket mode is refused for unsafe actions because it cannot provide the same request-scoped service-role boundary.

PUBLIC actions also receive mandatory audit logging (same audit table), since unauthenticated endpoints are high-risk by nature.

Without unsafe mode, unsafeDb is undefined in the executor params.

Raw SQL Policy

By default, the compiler rejects raw SQL in action code. Use Drizzle query-builder syntax whenever possible.

If a specific action must use raw SQL, opt in explicitly:

// features/ledgers/actions/reconcile.ts
import { z } from "zod";
import { sql } from "drizzle-orm";
import { defineAction } from "../.quickback/define-action";

export default defineAction({
  description: "Run custom reconciliation query",
  input: z.object({}),
  access: { roles: ["owner"] },
  allowRawSql: true,
  async execute({ db }) {
    return db.execute(sql`select 1`);
  },
});

Without allowRawSql: true, compilation fails with a loud error pointing to the action and snippet.

The detector checks for SQL keywords in string arguments, so non-SQL method calls like headers.get("X-Forwarded-For") or map.get("key") will not trigger false positives.

Sharing Code Between Actions

For Zod schemas, helpers, or constants used across multiple actions in a feature, put them under <feature>/lib/ and import from each action file. Files under lib/ are copied verbatim into the generated output.

features/applications/
├── applications.ts
├── actions/
│   ├── advance.ts
│   └── reject.ts
└── lib/
    ├── inputs.ts          ← shared Zod schemas
    └── transitions.ts     ← state-machine helpers
// features/applications/lib/inputs.ts
import { z } from "zod";

export const advanceInput = z.object({
  nextStatus: z.enum(["screening", "interview", "offer"]),
  notes: z.string().max(2000).optional(),
});
// features/applications/actions/advance.ts
import { defineAction } from "../.quickback/define-action";
import { advanceInput } from "../lib/inputs";

export default defineAction({
  description: "Move forward",
  input: advanceInput,
  access: { roles: ["owner"] },
  async execute({ db, record, input }) { /* … */ },
});

Importing Tables

Action files import tables from their own feature or other features. The compiler generates alias files for each table, so you import by the table's file name:

// features/applications/actions/advance.ts
import { eq, and } from "drizzle-orm";

// Same feature — import from parent directory using the table's file name
import { applications } from "../applications";
import { interviewScores } from "../interview-scores";

// Cross-feature — go up to the features directory, then into the other feature
import { candidates } from "../../candidates/candidates";
import { jobs } from "../../jobs/jobs";

Path pattern from features/{name}/actions/:

  • Same feature table: ../{table-file-name} (e.g., ../applications)
  • Other feature table: ../../{other-feature}/{table-file-name} (e.g., ../../candidates/candidates)
  • Generated lib files: ../../../lib/{module} (e.g., ../../../lib/realtime, ../../../lib/webhooks)

Executor Parameters

import type { Auth } from "better-auth";

interface ActionExecutorParams {
  db: DrizzleDB;           // Scoped database (auto-applies org/owner/soft-delete filters)
  unsafeDb?: DrizzleDB;    // Unscoped database (only available when unsafe mode is enabled)
  ctx: AppContext;         // User context (userId, roles, activeOrgId, activeTeamId, userRole)
  record?: TRecord;        // The record (record-based only, undefined for standalone)
  input: TInput;           // Validated input from Zod schema
  services: TServices;     // Configured integrations (billing, notifications, etc.)
  c: HonoContext;          // Raw Hono context for advanced use
  env: Env;                // Runtime bindings (Cloudflare env / process env). Alias for c.env.
  auth: Auth;              // Better Auth instance — call auth.api.getSession(...) etc. Lazy on Cloudflare.
  whereRecord?: (table) => SQL; // Pre-built WHERE: firewall + soft-delete + eq(table.id, record.id). Record-based actions only.
  whereTransition?: (table) => SQL; // whereRecord plus the transition's "from" precondition. Transition actions only.
}

auth — Better Auth instance

auth is the Better Auth instance, ready to call from inside an action handler. Use it for things like minting an OAuth access token, fetching the current session in a custom way, or invoking a Better Auth plugin method that isn't already exposed by the generated middleware.

// features/integrations/actions/connectGoogleDrive.ts
import { defineAction } from "../.quickback/define-action";
import { z } from "zod";

export default defineAction({
  description: "Get a fresh Google Drive access token for the signed-in user",
  input: z.object({}),
  access: { roles: ["AUTHENTICATED"] },
  async execute({ auth, ctx, c }) {
    // genericOAuth plugin method — needs a cast since the default-generic
    // `Auth` type doesn't carry plugin-specific API surface.
    const token = await (auth.api as any).getAccessToken({
      headers: c.req.raw.headers,
      body: { providerId: "google", userId: ctx.userId },
    });
    return { accessToken: token.accessToken };
  },
});

Lazy on Cloudflare: the generated handler emits a Proxy so createAuth(c.env, c.req.raw.cf) only runs the first time you read a property on auth. Actions that never touch auth pay zero construction cost. On Bun/Node auth is the imported singleton (an IIFE that lazy-loads the database adapter) wrapped in the same proxy shape — call sites are identical across runtimes.

Typing: auth is typed as Auth from better-auth. The base API (getSession, signOut, signInEmail, etc.) is fully typed. Plugin-only methods (getAccessToken from genericOAuth, admin-plugin methods, etc.) need a cast at the call site — the default-generic Auth doesn't infer the project's specific plugin set.

whereRecord — explicit, scope-safe WHERE

For protected-field writes inside record-based actions, prefer whereRecord(table) over eq(table.id, record.id). It returns a Drizzle expression that AND-merges the resource's firewall and soft-delete predicates with the record id, so the WHERE is explicit even if a future refactor swaps db back to an unscoped client:

// features/applications/actions/advance.ts
import { z } from "zod";
import { defineAction, applications } from "../.quickback/define-action";

export default defineAction({
  description: "Advance an application to the next status.",
  input: z.object({
    nextStatus: z.string(),
    notes: z.string().optional(),
  }),
  access: { roles: ["owner"] },
  async execute({ db, record, input, whereRecord }) {
    const [updated] = await db
      .update(applications)
      .set({
        status: input.nextStatus,
        notes: input.notes ?? record.notes,
      })
      .where(whereRecord!(applications))   // firewall + soft-delete + id, all in one
      .returning();
    return updated;
  },
});

The audit DB wrapper hard-stamps modifiedAt/modifiedBy on every .set() call, so handlers don't write them. The same wrapper hard-stamps createdAt/createdBy/modifiedAt/modifiedBy on every .values() — and on the conflict branch of an onConflictDoUpdate({...}) upsert. Caller-supplied audit fields are dropped on the floor — the audit log always reflects the real actor and the real moment.

Who the stamped actor is depends on the verified principal, never on anything the handler passes:

CallercreatedBy / modifiedBy value
Signed-in userthe Better Auth userId
Delegated principal (API key, service)actor:<type>:<id>
Scope-token principal (no account)scope:<kind>:<subjectId>
Cron schedule via withInternalContextsystem:cron-<name>
Queue handler via withInternalContextsystem:queue-<name>
No verified callerthe write throws (fail closed) — system-side code that must write outside a request uses the raw client and owns its own provenance

Don't hand-build audit timestamps as a "just in case" fallback: on the wrapped db they're dead code, and the idiom is a portability trap — Postgres audit columns take Date objects while SQLite takes ISO strings (the wrapper picks the right one per dialect).

whereRecord is undefined for standalone actions (they have no record), so the parameter is typed as optional. whereTransition extends whereRecord with the transition's "from" precondition for transition actions.

Reaching Better Auth tables (authDb)

The scoped db only sees your feature tables. To read Better Auth tables — users, organizations, members — use the auth database connection from the Hono context plus the generated lib/org-access.ts helper:

// features/projects/actions/assign.ts — validate a userId is an org member
import { z } from "zod";
import { eq } from "drizzle-orm";
import { ActionError } from "@quickback/compiler";
import { defineAction, projects } from "../.quickback/define-action";
import { getOrgMemberRole } from "../../../lib/org-access";

export default defineAction({
  description: "Assign a project to an org member",
  input: z.object({ assigneeId: z.string() }),
  access: { roles: ["member", "admin"] },
  async execute({ db, record, input, ctx, c, whereRecord }) {
    // getOrgMemberRole(authDb, userId, organizationId) → role string | null
    const role = await getOrgMemberRole(c.get("authDb"), input.assigneeId, ctx.activeOrgId!);
    if (!role) {
      throw new ActionError("Assignee is not a member of this organization", "NOT_A_MEMBER", 400);
    }
    const [updated] = await db
      .update(projects)
      .set({ assigneeId: input.assigneeId })
      .where(whereRecord!(projects))
      .returning();
    return updated;
  },
});

c.get("authDb") is the Drizzle connection to the auth database (in dual-DB mode it's a separate D1 from your features). For richer queries, import the auth schema tables from ../../../auth/schema and query authDb directly.

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